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Abstract: Inspired by Innovation System theory, donors promote Innovation Platforms (IP) to 
enhance collaboration for development. However, the question arises whether this is the best ap-
proach to facilitate change. The article presents the experience of an action-research programme 
(2009-2013) on the value of IPs for creating institutional change for the benefit of smallholders, 
in various value chain contexts in West Africa. We analyse the cases from a dialectic perspective 
on institutional entrepreneurship. Results show: the open IP approach, with some clear principles 
and in-depth analysis of the antagonistic context, enabled the initiator-cum-facilitators to create a 
reasonably effective IP coalition that endorsed broker activities fit for the context. In a mature 
value chain, it was possible to mobilise incumbent actors, who perceived a mutual benefit in en-
hancing smallholder development. In the other cases, IPs were started at lower administrative 
levels, building discursive legitimacy and -appeal to mobilise smallholders and higher level au-
thorities for institutional change. We note a researcher-initiated open IP approach is able to in-
duce strategic action in-situ, but the approach has its limitation: In the time given, IPs could nei-
ther build a cooperative smallholder movement, nor interest private export companies to invest in 
smallholders; nor tackle misaligned political interests.  
Keywords: Innovation platforms, Institutional entrepreneurship, dialectics, strategic choice, Sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
Introduction 
Innovation system theory highlights the need for more communication and collaboration amongst 
heterogeneous groups of actors to enhance innovation and development (Lundvall, 1992; Clark, 
2002). Within the agricultural sector, this new perspective gave rise to a wide variety of innova-
tion brokerage and partnerships, initiated by researchers, extension officers, NGO’s as well as 
private actors (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2009; Spielman et al, 2010).  To be able to deal with all kinds 
of opportunities and problems, development organisations in sub-Saharan Africa now tend to 
promote multi-stakeholder innovation platforms (IP) for coordinated learning and action. 
Through their diversified membership, IPs are assumed: (a) to provide a space to better negotiate 
and manage competing interests for the common good and for marginalised actors, enhancing 
transparency and accountability among the different actors in the value chain, and (b) to have 
access to distributed knowledge and networks, that enable them to see opportunities, and to mobi-
lise allies and resources to endorse collective action (Brinkerhoff, 2007). In practice, there are 
various interpretations and forms of IPs and the question arises whether and how different types 
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of IP approaches are effective in creating innovation (Smits & Kuhlmann, 2004; Kilelu et al., 
2013). This article aims to address these issues by answering a number of questions: What types 
of IPs emerge? How do these IPs manage to create institutional change? And what can we learn 
concerning the potential and limitation of the IP approach?  
We explore these questions with the concept of institutional entrepreneurship, analyzing the ex-
perience of the Convergence of Science-Strengthening Innovation Systems (CoS SIS) programme 
in Benin, Ghana and Mali, funded by the Dutch department of development cooperation DGIS.  
The first phase of the CoS research programme ended in 2006, concluding that within the various 
value chains contexts in Benin and Ghana, resource-poor farmers had very small windows of 
opportunity, and that no substantial poverty alleviation could be achieved through technology 
development. This inspired CoS researchers to explore the possibility of stretching the windows 
of opportunity through institutional change (van Huis et al, 2007; Röling, 2010), and they formu-
lated a CoS SIS research programme (2008-2013). This programme worked from an innovation 
system perspective, and engaged in action research on IPs (see Nederlof and Pyburn 2012; 
Hounkonnou et al. 2012 for an overview).  
Theoretical framework 
We conceptualise the COS SIS programme and their IPs as (a collective of) institutional entre-
preneurs. Institutional Entrepreneurs (IE) are embedded actors, who leverage resources to create 
new or transform existing institutions (Dimaggio, 1988; Garud et al, 2007). Institutions are sets of 
rules that exist to reduce uncertainty in human interaction (North, 1990). They comprise of for-
mal rules (e.g. laws, standards, policies) as well as informal norms and procedures (practices, 
codes of conduct). The literature distinguishes mature operational fields, emerging fields and ma-
ture fields in crisis, which provide quite distinctive institutional challenges, opportunities and 
resources for institutional entrepreneurship (Fligstein, 1997; Maguire et al, 2004; Battilana et al, 
2009). Mature fields are characterised by a coherent discourse, widely diffused, accepted norms 
and procedures, a well-organised set of roles and stable relationships of cooperation and domina-
tion. In an emerging field, actors recognise some degree of mutual interest but there is still little 
coordinated action among them (Fligstein, 1997; Maguire et al, 2004.  
Like Benson (1977) and Seo & Creed (2002), we apply a dialectic perspective and focus on the 
dynamics between the context and the emergence and strategic action of IEs. External factors but 
also institutional gaps and internal tensions in the operational field induce institutional entrepre-
neur-ship. There are various forces, creating institutional contradictions and tension in mature 
operational fields (Seo & Creed, 2002), e.g.: 
- Conformity undermining functional efficiency: Organisations gain legitimacy and re-
sources by becoming isomorphic with the institutional environment, but this conformity 
hinders efficiency, as local problems require diverse and customised solutions (Dimaggio 
& Powell, 1983). 
- Inter-institutional incompatibilities. Actors are embedded in pluralistic institutional envi-
ronments that are often imbued with sharply inconsistent prescriptions, norms for action, 
supported by rational myths (Meyer and Rowan, 1997).  
- Divergent interests. Actors have divergent interests and asymmetric power; hence institu-
tional arrangements are the products of political struggles and strategic action (Seo & 
Creed 2002).  
Gaps and contradictions in operational fields may lead to social upheaval, technological disrup-
tion, competitive discontinuity and regulatory changes that disturb the field-level consensus and 
call for new ideas (Fligstein 1997, Greenwood, 2002; Battilana et al, 2009: 74). Whether this 
condition leads to institutional entrepreneurship, depends on (Seo & Creed, 2002; Maguire et al, 
2004; Battilana et al, 2009; Avelino & Rotmans, 2009): 
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- An actor’s willingness (reflexive awareness and interest for change) 
- An actor’s capacity to create change, defined by one’sF 
o Formal and informal authority and network position  
o Access to critical resources 
o Vision on the problem and possible solution. 
o Personal psychology and skills 
Whether and institutional entrepreneur is able to loosen potential allies from their embeddedness, 
to form a critical mass for change, depends on an actor’s authority and network position; critical 
resources and the perceived legitimacy of the applied broker activities (vision and communication 
activities). Various studies found that divergent change is more likely to be initiated by actors at 
the periphery of a field, as they have more to gain and less to lose. However, when actors in the 
centre become negatively affected by ineffectiveness or institutional contradictions, they might 
also consider strategic change and have more power resources to create this (Battilana et al, 
2009).  
Research method  
In 2009, the CIS SIS project initiated nine IPs in Benin, Ghana, and Mali to test the feasibility of 
the innovation system approach for creating institutional change to benefit smallholder farmers 
and processors.  To explore the divergence of institutional entrepreneurship in different value 
chain contexts we selected four cases with distinctive field characteristics: a mature value chain 
with high involvement of the public sector (Cocoa, Ghana); a value chain in crisis due to misa-
ligned interests (Cotton, Benin); a developing value chain (Palm-oil, Ghana), and an emerging 
value chain threatened by institutional incompatibilities (Dairy in Office de Niger (ON), Mali). 
The findings in this study are based on a longitudinal tracking of developments in the studied 
cases, i.e. an innovation-ethnography.  The authors were the Research Associates (RA) facilitat-
ing the platforms. An events analysis was conducted during the period 2010–2013 to identify the 
choices made, the evolution of platform implementation, and the achievements over time. The 
information for this analysis was acquired through personal participation of the authors, informal 
interviews with platform members, as well as workshops in which platform members jointly re-
flected on the performance of the platform. Although the case study methodology does not allow 
for statistical generalization, it does allow for analytical generalization, i.e. using previously de-
veloped theory as a template for comparison and reflection (Yin 2003).   
 
Findings 
 
The formation of Innovation platforms 
The CoS-SIS programme can more or less be conceptualised as a two-step process of institutional 
entrepreneurship (refer to figure 1). In a first long preparatory phase, programme leaders man-
aged to acquire funding and build relationships with national research institutes and policy mak-
ers in the various countries, to identify three agricultural value-chain domains of national interest 
in each country. Then they recruited part-time RAs, knowledgeable about the respective domains, 
to execute scoping studies and subsequently act as IP initiators-cum-facilitators. The studies pro-
vided an initial multi-scale analysis of histories, contexts and issues of concern for smallholder 
development. They were followed by in-depth diagnostic studies (Jiggins, ed., 2012).  A stake-
holder-analysis was applied to (a) identify all relevant actors for a workshop to improve the prob-
lem analysis and proposed actions, and (b) invite actors, critical for and willing to join an IP to 
execute the envisaged action. The platforms were to start with a core group of empowered farmer 
representatives, and flexibly involve higher level actors up to 8 or 9 members critical to the im-
plementation of the prioritized platform tasks. Organisations were asked to delegate personalities 
“who were open-minded, and not self-centred, able to think outside the box, and not likely to 
disrupt the process“. In this way, the CoS SIS leaders, together with the RAs acted as institutional 
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entrepreneurs, introducing new arrangements of communication and collaboration within the re-
spective value chains.  
Figure 1: Process of embedded Institutional Entrepreneurship in CoS SIS programme 
 
 
 
Quite different types of platforms emerged. The field structure of the value chain and the main 
problems experienced by the smallholders determined the vision framing of the RAs, when re-
cruiting members for the IP. The RAs were not very powerful institutional entrepreneurs: they 
had some funds to pay for meetings and small training sessions (critical resource), and the formal 
authority to execute action research, but they had no authority to establish new formal policy ar-
rangements. However, they enjoyed some discursive legitimacy as they cared for the smallhold-
ers (normative appeal) and appeared knowledgeable about the respective domains. IP members 
noted they appreciated the problem analysis and the composition of the invited IP group “as it is a 
group, competent to perform the task” and “it allows me to provide the services, our office is 
usually not capable to provide’.  In most cases, it was the strategic vision and open communica-
tion approach, in which actors were invited to critique proposals and adapt IP action priorities for 
smallholder benefit, which led to the emergence of various types of IPs (Table 1). All IPs includ-
ed representatives of the smallholders, the public sector, some NGO’s and one or two actors from 
the for-profit private sector. However, most private sector actors preferred not to share their in-
side information in an IP, nor to explicitly invest in smallholder development. To allow open col-
legiate information exchange and collaboration actors preferred IP participants from similar lev-
els of action and social position. As a result, IPs comprised national level or local/district level 
actors. The exception was the IP of the developing palm-oil value chain. As no palm-oil business 
services existed in the producer area, the palm-oil IP consisted of local smallholders and national 
level regulatory authorities. 
 
 
   
Table 1: Field structure, vision and mobilisation of allies for smallholder-beneficial institutional change 
Field structure and main institutional problems 
Cocoa value chain Ghana Cotton value chain Benin 
 
Palm-oil value chain Ghana Dairy/Livestock integration at ON Mali 
In 2007, Cocoa is important for livelihood 
(30% population), GDP (8.5%), export 
earnings (33%)  and government revenue t 
from taxes and levies (16.4% FoB price); 
hence government platform (COCOBOD) 
arranges credit, pest spraying gangs, farmer 
price, export marketing, etc. SAP induces 
gradual reforms allowing some Licenced 
Produce Buying Companies (LBC), less 
extension, Cargill processing, but still qual-
ity and price control by government. Large 
margin between farmer and export price 
means it is not lucrative for farmers to in-
vest in cocoa production or smuggle cocoa 
to Ivory Coast. (Quarmine et al, 2012) 
 
 
Inefficiency and some misalignment of 
interests  
In 2002, cotton production accounted 
for13% GDP, 45% fiscal returns, and 80% 
export revenue.  
In line with Structural Adjustment Policy 
(SAP), government liberalised input supply 
for cotton. 
Commercial input traders pay for political 
and administrative support, to earn profit 
via input supply. Individual rent-seeking 
behaviour. 
Reduced world market prices, with in-
creased input prices, and delayed delivery 
inputs make farm produced cotton by 
smallholders unviable. (Togbé et al, 2012) 
 
 
 
Misalignment of interests 
In Ghana there are 2 types of palm-oil pro-
duction: industrial production for export and 
traditional smallholder production for the 
local market. Traditionally, palm-oil pro-
duction was no concern of the Min of Agr., 
and received no extension services, input 
subsidies etc. Now that world market prices 
rise, government earmarked palm-oil as 
domain for strategic development. However 
smallholders have no access to the export 
market, due to poor production and process-
ing techniques, and they lack the institu-
tional support needed to improve it (Osei-
Amponsah et al, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
Gaps in institutional arrangements
In 1994 the parastatal organisation Office de 
Niger (ON), responsible for the agr. service 
delivery and infrastructure in the irrigated 
rice-producing area, dropped livestock from 
its mandate. Farmers were supposed to 
specialise in irrigated crop production. Nev-
ertheless the migrated farmers continued the 
tradition to invest their profit in livestock, 
as security capital. Roaming livestock en-
genders crop- and infrastructural damage, 
and costly juridical conflicts. The presently 
promoted dairy production is hampered by 
crop damage conflicts, missing livestock 
infrastructure, and lack of farmer expertise 
in intensive livestock production. (Doumbia 
et al, 2012) 
 
Institutional incompatibilities 
1st step brokerage: Strategic vision framing plus networking with respected  smallholder representatives plus regional or national actors critical to the implementation of the 
envisaged task by RAs 
 
To enhance equitable, effective value chain 
governance with good incentives and in-
formation access for farmers, stimulating 
production with less waste (link national 
interest to reduce inefficiency with small-
holder interests) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional change needed to solve prob-
lematic input supply and low margins for  
farmers, to ensure future of cotton value 
chain (taking position in problematic situa-
tion of misalignment). 
 
New processing techniques and value chain 
organisation are needed to conquer export 
markets (identifying institutional gaps to 
overcome). 
 
To create space for dairy development, 
livestock farmers, village communities, and 
local authorities have to establish new farm 
practices and natural resource use conven-
tions (resolving incompatibility). 
   
Formation of Innovation Platform for smallholder-inclusive institutional change 
National level IP  
 
Farmers are represented by charismatic 
village chief cum vice president Cocoa-
Coffee-Sheanut Farmer Association and 
related cocoa input company, farmer-based 
marketing company Kuapa Kokoo.  
 
Other members: the Ghana Cocoa Board 
(COCOBOD) with representatives of its 
research institute CRIG and Quality Control 
Company officers at national and regional 
level, researcher from Ghana Standards 
Authority; and the advisor of the Minister of 
Finance and Economics. 
 
 
Not interested: Private export companies. 
Three collaborating local level IPs  
 
Farmers are represented by experimenting 
farmers plus a big farmer who is member 
National Agricultural Chamber. 
 
Other members: Agricultural extension 
office (CeRPA/CARDER), municipality, 
cotton revival project (PARFCB), northern 
cotton research centre (INRAB), cotton 
fibre processor N’Dali. 
 
Not interested: Association of private cotton 
ginners and traders (IAC); National Devel-
opment Organisations. 
 
 
Mixed IP: district level and national level 
actors 
 
District level 
Smallholder farmers, small-scale processors 
and mill owners who are also members of 
Kwaebibrim District Assembly. 
Other: District Officer Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (MoFA), scientists.    
 
National level 
Ghana Export Promotion Authority 
(GEPA), Ghana Standards Authority 
(GSA), Ghana Regional Appropriate Tech-
nology Industrial Service (GRATIS), and 
the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). 
 
Not interested: Export companies 
Local level IP 
 
Farmer repr.: five dairy village coopera-
tives. 
 
Other members: Local livestock production 
service (SLPIA), milk factory owner, or-
ganization of veterinaries, ON Niono area 
officer, General Secretary of Niono munici-
pality, and  NGO Faranci providing training 
and assistance in law and farmer organiza-
tion. 
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The IP mobilization of allies and value chain actors to enact change 
The second step of institutional entrepreneurship concerned the strategic action of the IPs to 
overcome the identified tension in the value chain. It took some time before IP members gained 
trust in each other and understood the role they could play, but the first information sharing and 
networking activities helped to create mutual trust, confidence and focus.  At this stage we see 
that the different types of platforms (composition and task) engaged in different types of broker 
activities mobilising critical allies to create and support change and/or directly persuading value 
chain actors, notably smallholders, to change their practices.  
Mature value chains 
We first look at the two long-standing export sectors that emerged in the colonial period, became 
state controlled after independence, and are in a process of liberalisation since the IMF and World 
Bank enforcement of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) in the 1980s.  
 
National Cocoa IP, to reduce inefficiency 
The Ghanaian government decided to liberalise the cocoa sector at a gradual pace and still retains 
important control via COCOBOD (Ton et al, 2008). In this sector the high-level IP members easi-
ly recognised the critical importance of smallholder production for value chain success and gov-
ernment revenues; hence they used their power to improve governance efficiency, increasing fi-
nancial incentives plus input supply transparency needed to stimulate smallholder production. 
The IP members were high-level advisors and policy officers, who had the authority to study is-
sues at hand and prepare decisions to be ratified by the directors. 
Local cotton IPs cotton, to create bypass and create space in structured field 
In Benin, the government withdrew subsidies and public services in line with SAP, so farmers 
faced increased input costs and dwindling cotton world market prices (Togbé et al, 2012). Input 
traders paid political parties and government officers to obtain recognised trader’s positions, 
which led to corruption and individual rent-seeking. The interests of the Association of cotton 
ginners and traders (IAC) plus their high-level informal alliances sharply diverged from the 
smallholder interests. It was impossible to mobilise the IAC constituency, so the RA opted for a 
multipronged approach: to create a local level IP to work on a concrete technical (by-pass) solu-
tion for the farmers (use of local extracted Neem oil as an alternative pesticide), while making 
sure some respected good-hearted actors with higher-level political influence, also joined. 
Though political matters were not explicitly discussed in IP meetings, the membership of the 
Farmer-cum-Secretary of the Agricultural Chamber and the highly respected cotton extension 
officers motivated them to join informal, confidential coalition efforts to get a respected input 
trader back in business and highlighted the precariousness of the situation at high-level meetings. 
In 2013, the President of Benin withdrew the authority of IAC to arrange the input supply, and 
used the military to directly deliver the required fertiliser and pesticides to the farmers. The dis-
cursive legitimacy of the IP and its influential members might have played a role in this change. 
However, the main input trader has a dominant position in the world market for West-Africa, and 
now obstructs the country’s access to critical inputs. 
Emerging value chains 
The IPs of the emerging smallholder export sector of palm-oil in Ghana and emerging dairy sec-
tor in ON, Mali, also used a two-pronged approach, but enjoyed more enthusiasm and coopera-
tion from higher level administrative authorities than the cotton IP in Benin. In both IPs, the 
smallholder representatives together with expert members first researched the institutional con-
straints at the local level, to subsequently organise awareness-campaigns, to persuade smallhold-
ers to change their practices. To back-up the change process, the IPs networked with higher level 
authorities to align formal institutions.  
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Mixed level palm-oil IP, to establish new rules and procedures e.g. for emerging opportunities 
In the palm-oil sector, the IP first invited the Environmental protection agency to study the health 
and environmental effects of tyre burning (fuel for palm fruit processing). The active involvement 
of smallholders in the research, the evidence-based proof of toxicity, the profitable solution (use 
the processing waste as alternative fuel) and large awareness campaign, inspired quite some 
smallholders to stop toxic  tyre-burning. Others followed when several local chiefs heard the 
message and decided to set sanctions of tyre burning. 
The IP was less successful in its activities to ensure smallholder access to the lucrative export 
market. A PhD guided smallholder experiments to improve palm fruit storage and processing 
techniques to attain a better quality, but they did not manage to interest an export company. Due 
to out-dated equipment and labour intensive processing techniques, the cost price was too high. 
Various international export companies constructed their own mills, but seemed not eager to pro-
vide small mill-owners with equipment. Encouraged by the Ghana Export Promotion Authority 
(GEPA), the smallholder representatives have started to organise short training on business and 
cooperative management. If smallholders accept to organise themselves in cooperatives, GEPA 
promises to allocate part of its export promotion fund to them, so as to enable the purchase of 
new processing equipment. 
Local Dairy IP, to tackle institutional incompatibilities for livestock keeping 
In Office de Niger, IP members gathered the legal texts and had in-depth village discussions on 
the applicability of and adherence to natural resource use conventions, traditional conflict media-
tion, and costly formal adjudication. During these meetings villagers acknowledged that collec-
tive respect of traditional institutions for natural resource use and conflict mediation could solve 
their problem. Both investigations engendered clear recommendations for behavioural change; 
hence the IPs organised large public meetings and action theatre in an attempt to persuade farm-
ers to adapt practices. To align the formal procedures, the IP organised a workshop for higher 
level authorities, and followed their advice to engage a juridical consultant for preparing legal 
adjustments. Meanwhile they nurtured personal contacts with high-level authorities, who seemed 
willing to ensure ratification of the proposed legislative changes.  
Analysis and discussion 
Within the innovation system literature there is a debate whether to promote IPs or more distrib-
uted, flexible, opportunity-capturing types of brokerage. Whilst the concept of Multi-stakeholder 
Innovation Platform seems clear and self-evident, there are various interpretations and ways of 
operationalising an IP. Many donor-funded projects use IPs mainly to up-scale technical research 
efforts, while others apply a more flexibly opportunity and problem-driven approach. This re-
search demonstrates the strategic entrepreneurship dynamics of a researcher-initiated open IP 
approach for pro-poor value chain development (Table 2.). Application of core IP design princi-
ples engendered quite different forms of institutional entrepreneurship, in different field struc-
tures. CoS SIS programme leaders and RAs reflexively articulated a platform composition and 
brokered activities, fit to tackle the prime institutional tensions constraining smallholder devel-
opment. Value chain actors, invited to join the IP, made their own assessment whether to join or 
not. Many joined, as they were aware of the institutional constraints for smallholder development 
(normative appeal), and appreciated the research competence of the RA as well as the compe-
tences of other key actors, mobilised by the RA. Others felt they had to prioritise their personal or 
business interest. 
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Table 2: Field-dependant strategic IP composition and brokerage  
Structure value chain with institutional tension 
Cocoa Ghana: Mature field 
with inefficiency and some 
misaligned interests 
Cotton Benin: Mature 
field with misaligned 
interests 
Palm-oil Ghana: Emerging 
field with gaps in institu-
tional arrangements 
Dairy Mali: Emerging 
field in mature domain 
with Institutional incom-
patibilities 
In field, 1st step brokerage created different IP composition and 2nd step broker activities 
Composition IP 
 National level platform  
 
 
Three collaborating local 
level IPs 
 
Mixed IP: district level and 
national level actors 
 
Local level IP 
 
2nd step brokerage by IP 
National level 
High-level policy officers 
took the lead in the crea-
tion of change as they had 
the formal authority to 
prepare policy for national 
decision-makers such as 
the minister or COCO-
BOD directors. 
  
Government authorities 
provide critical resources 
(knowledge, contacts export 
companies; maybe invest-
ment fund and equipment in 
future) 
 
District/local officer level  
Together with the 
Farmer-cum-Secretariat 
of the agricultural 
Chamber, extension took 
the lead in the informal 
networking and advo-
cacy at higher level 
public officers to stimu-
late action for change 
  
Local officers active in 
networking, awareness 
raising and collaboration 
with higher level govern-
ment officers, with the 
position to adjust the for-
mal juridical framework 
Smallholder level 
Main role of farmer repre-
sentatives was to put issues 
on the IP agenda 
 
 
Farmer representative 
engaged in development 
of bypass (alternative 
pesticide)  
 
Smallholder representatives 
took lead in awareness-
campaign against tyre burn-
ing, and training of farmers 
in business management and 
processing cooperatives. 
Smallholder representative 
actively involved in 
awareness-raising 
 
 
From the case studies we learn that in mature export value chains, it is most effective for re-
searchers to enhance smallholder development through national level IPs. High-level IP members 
have the formal authority to formulate new rules and norms, beneficial for smallholders. Howev-
er the cotton case showed that, when corruption and rent-seeking behaviour prevails, an IP needs 
to focus on non-sensitive local activities and can only informally network to give voice to con-
cerns at a higher level. The influence of the IP, to make a difference for smallholders, mainly 
derives from the ‘normative appeal’ to care for the poor. This is also the case for the influence 
exerted by IPs in emerging value chains. In emerging or developing value chains, IPs seem most 
effective when they can solve a concrete-felt problem of the smallholder through their contacts 
with national researchers and authorities, who are able to provide the necessary knowledge and 
services. Due to the history of the farmer organisation in West-Africa, smallholder capacity 
building for collective processing and marketing, however, is a delicate, strenuous and slow pro-
cess. And linkages with private output traders are a must, but require careful preparation and me-
diation. Emerging value chains that encounter institutional incompatibilities may require different 
types of IP approaches, depending on the balance of interests and power relations.  
From these cases we conclude that an open, flexible IP approach has the potential to develop into 
strategically, effective institutional entrepreneurship. A thorough systemic analysis should guide 
the broker activities. Other types of partnership approaches might also create good results, so 
 375 
more comparative research is needed to gain more in-depth insight. Spontaneous, private actor 
brokerage may be as effective as well as orchestrated IP intermediation. The cases suggest that it 
is critical that institutional entrepreneurs should be highly motivated; reflexively study the ten-
sions in the context; develop a vision and communicative strategy, and act out to mobilise the 
right allies and resources to create change. The promotion of a small, flexible IP approach with 
some core principles might help to create momentum and collaborative drive, but needs strategic 
elaboration in-situ.  
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